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I.

INTRODUCTION

1

As of February 2006, the U.S. government held more than 500
2
individuals at Guantánamo Bay as alleged “enemy combatants.” In
*

Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, and Director, Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Policy and Research.
**
Partner, Denbeaux & Denbeaux. Co-authors Professor Mark Denbeaux and
Joshua Denbeaux represent two Guantánamo detainees. This report also benefited
from the research and contributions of Grace Byrd, Christopher Fox, Jillian Gautier,
Doug Eadie, Mark Muoio, Courtney Ray, Laura Sims and Lauren Winchester.
1
This Report, originally published on February 8, 2006, used government data
obtained from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation to profile over 517 detainees held at Guantánamo. The primary sources used were the Combatant Status
Review Tribunal (CSRT) files. See discussion infra Part II for more on the CSRTs.
Since this Report’s initial publication, the detainee population at Guantánamo has
been
reduced
to
171.
The
Guantánamo
Docket,
N.Y.
TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/held (last visited Sept.
27, 2011). In addition, more information has been made available through later
government releases and WikiLeaks. This Report was not updated based on WikiLeaks. For future reports by the Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Policy
and
Research
(the
“Center”),
visit
the
Center’s
website
at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/Guantan
amo-Reports.cfm.
2
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) and Administrative Review Board (ARB)
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
DEF.,
Documents,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/index.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2011) [hereinafter CSRT]. The original government released
files used for this Report are on file with the author at the Center. The above
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attempting to defend the necessity of the Guantánamo detention
camp, the government routinely referred to this group as “the worst
3
of the worst” of the government’s enemies. The government had detained most of these individuals for more than four years; yet only
ten, approximately, were charged with any violations of the laws of
4
war. The rest remained detained based on the government’s own
5
conclusions, without the prospect of a trial or judicial hearing. During these lengthy detentions, the government had sufficient time to
conclude whether, in fact, these men were enemy combatants and to
document its rationale.
On March 28, 2002, in a Department of Defense briefing, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said:
As has been the case in previous wars, the country that takes prisoners generally decides that they would prefer them not to go
back to the battlefield. They detain those “enemy combatants”
for the duration of the conflict. They do so for the very simple
reason, which I would have thought is obvious——namely to keep
them from going right back and in this case killing more Ameri6
cans and conducting more terrorist acts.

This Report concludes, however, that the large majority of detainees never participated in any combat against the United States on
a battlefield. Therefore, while setting aside the significant legal and
constitutional issues at stake in federal Guantánamo habeas litigation,
this Report merely addresses the factual basis underlying the public
representations regarding the status of the Guantánamo detainees as
made in 2006.

sources, released after this Report’s initial publication, contain the data relevant to
this Report and also include new data such as detainee names and Internment Serial
Numbers (ISNs).
3
See Joseph Margulies, A Year and Holding, Limbo is No Place to Detain Them,
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2002, at B1 (“Rear Adm. John D. Stufflebeem, deputy director
of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said: ‘They are bad guys. They are the
worst of the worst, and if let out on the street, they will go back to the proclivity of
trying to kill Americans and others.’”).
4
Peter Finn, Guantanamo Detainee Faces Capital Charges in Cole Attack, WASH. POST,
Apr. 21, 2011, at A3.
5
Since initial publication, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
detainees at Guantánamo are entitled to file habeas petitions and to participate in
hearings. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
6
Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., Department of Defense News Briefing—
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers (Mar. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3380; see also Katherine Q. Seelye, Threats and Responses: The Detainees; Some Guantanamo Prisoners Will
Be Freed, Rumsfeld Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at A14.
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Part II of this Report describes the sources and limitations of the
data analyzed here. Part III describes the government’s “findings.”
These “findings” constitute the government’s determination that the
individual in question was an enemy combatant. The government
made this determination based on its classifications of terrorist
groups, asserted connections between the individual and the purported terrorist groups, and the commission of “hostile acts,” if any,
that the government determined that the individual committed. Part
IV then examines the evidence, including sources for such evidence,
upon which the government relied in making these findings. Part V
addresses the continued detention of individuals deemed not to be
enemy combatants by comparing the government’s allegations
against such persons to similar or more serious allegations against
persons still deemed to be “enemy combatants.”
II. THE DATA
This Report examines data from written determinations that the
government produced in 2006 for the detainees designated as “ene7
my combatants.” The government prepared these written determinations following the military hearings, known as Combatant Status
Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which commenced in 2004 and were designed to ascertain whether a detainee should continue to be classi8
fied as an “enemy combatant.” The data are limited for a number of
reasons. The data are framed in the government’s terms and, as
such, are no more precise than the government’s categories permit.
In addition, the charges were anonymous in the sense that the summaries upon which this Report relies did not identify by name or In9
ternment Serial Number (ISN)any of the prisoners. It was therefore
not possible to determine which summary applied to which prisoner
at the time the Report was compiled.
Within these limitations, however, the data were very powerful
because they set forth the government’s publically released case for
the status of the individuals. This Report assumes that the information contained in the CSRT summaries of evidence was an accurate
description of the evidence relied upon by the government to conclude that each prisoner was an enemy combatant. The government
7

See CSRT, supra note 2.
David L. McColgin, Editorial, Guantanamo: Five Years and Counting, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE (Pa.), Mar. 4, 2007, at H-1.
9
Names and ISNs are now available through government releases. This does
not change the findings of this Report, and later reports by the Center analyze more
recent government releases.
8
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filed these summaries against each individual detainee in advance of
each detainee’s CSRT hearing.
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S FINDINGS OF ENEMY COMBATANT STATUS
A. Structure of the Government’s Findings
For each detainee deemed an “enemy combatant,” the government provided a summary of evidence. Each summary contained the
following sentence: “The United States Government has previously de10
termined that the detainee is an ‘enemy combatant.’” This “determination [was] based on information possessed by the United States
11
that indicate[d] that [the detainee qualified for his designation].”
Since the government had “previously determined” that each detainee at Guantánamo Bay was an “enemy combatant” before the CSRT
hearing, the “summary of evidence” released by the government is
not the government’s allegations against each detainee; rather, it is a
summary of the government’s proofs upon which the government
based its determination.
Each summary of evidence has four numbered paragraphs. The
12
13
first and fourth paragraphs are jurisdictional in nature. The
second paragraph state the government’s definition of “enemy com14
batant” for purposes of the CSRT proceedings. The third paragraph
10
See e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Hicks, David Mathew to Pers. Representative at 1, Hicks
v. United States, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2004)[hereinafter, Summary,
Hicks],
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf.
11
Id.
12
See, e.g., id. (“Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.”).
13
See, e.g., id. at 2.
The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an
enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee
desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability
and relevance of evidence or witnesses.
Id.
14
See, e.g., id. at 1. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who
was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes
any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in
aid of enemy forces.” Id. (emphasis added).
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summarizes the evidence that convinced the government that each
15
detainee was an “enemy combatant.” Paragraph 3(a) is the government’s determination of the detainee’s relationship with a “defined
16
terrorist organization.” Paragraph 3(b) explains the government’s
finding that a detainee had or had not committed “hostile acts”
17
against the United States or coalition forces. In 55% of the reports,
the government concluded that the detainee had not committed
such an act and omitted the entire paragraph 3(b) section from the
CSRT summary. Forty-five percent of the time, the government concluded that the detainee had committed paragraph 3(b) hostile acts
against United States or coalition forces and in these cases there is a
paragraph 3(b) in the CSRT summary to that effect. For those detainees whose CSRT summaries include a 3(b) finding, the government
listed its specific findings “proving” the existence of the hostile acts in
a brief series of sub-paragraphs. Of those CSRT summaries that contain a paragraph 3(b) “hostile acts” determination, the mean number
of sub-paragraphs was two. That is, in the CSRT summaries of the
45% of detainees who allegedly committed 3(b) hostile acts, the government cited an average of two pieces of evidence for its conclusions. Fewer than 2% of all 517 CSRT summaries contained more
than five 3(b) sub-paragraphs, whereas the vast majority contained
one and three such “proofs” of hostile acts.
B. The Definition of Enemy Combatant
For the purposes of the CSRT, an “enemy combatant” is defined
as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person
who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities
18
in aid of enemy forces.”
15

See, e.g., id. at 1–2.
See discussion infra Part IV.A. Many of the “defined terrorist organizations” referenced in the CSRT summaries of evidence are not considered terrorist organizations by the Department of Homeland Security. For a May 2011 list of designated
foreign terrorist organizations, see Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
(last updated Sept. 15, 2011).
17
See, e.g., Summary, Hicks, supra note 10, at 1–2.
18
See, e.g., id. at 3. The definition of “enemy combatant” for the purpose of
Guantánamo detainment has evolved. In January 2002, when the first detainees were
sent from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Cuba, they were termed, as were the detainees
in Ex parte Quirin, “unlawful belligerents.” 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942). In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the government defined “enemy combatant” far more narrowly as someone who
was “‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’
16
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This could be interpreted as requiring either that a combatant
be both a member of a prohibited group and engaged in hostilities
against the United States or coalition forces or, alternatively, that a
combatant be either a member of a prohibited group or engaged in
hostilities against the United States or coalition forces. Indeed, under this definition, one could be detained for an undefined level of
“support” to groups considered hostile to the United States or its coalition forces.
C. Categories of Evidence Supporting Enemy Combatant Designation
The government divided the evidence against detainees into two
sections: a paragraph 3(a), nexus with prohibited organizations, and
a paragraph 3(b), participation in military operations or commission
19
of hostile acts. Paragraph 3 always begins with the allegation that
each detainee met all the requirements contained in the definition of
20
paragraph 2. More often than not, the government found that the
detainees did not commit the alleged hostile or belligerent acts.

in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’
there.” 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004). Later, in response to Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004), the detainees were called “enemy combatants.”
In February 2004, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said:
The circumstances in which individuals are apprehended on the battlefield can be ambiguous, as I’m sure people here can understand. This
ambiguity is not only the result of the inevitable disorder of the battlefield, it is an ambiguity created by enemies who violate the laws of war
by fighting in civilian clothes, by carrying multiple identification documentations, by having three, six, eight, in one case 13 different aliases. . . . Because of this ambiguity, even after enemy combatants are detained, it takes time to check stories, to resolve inconsistencies or, in
some cases, even to get the detainee to provide any useful information
to help resolve the circumstance.
Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., Address to the Miami Chamber of Commerce (Feb.
13, 2004), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/0402/13/se.02.html).
On August 13, 2004, Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary Rumsfeld’s designee for the tribunal process at Guantánamo, stated that “[t]he definition
of an enemy combatant is in the implementing orders, which have been passed out
to everyone. But in short, it means anyone who is part of supporting the Taliban or
al Qaeda forces or associated forces engaging in hostilities against the United States
or our coalition partners.” Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, Special Defense Department Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunals (Aug. 13, 2004), available
at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2560.
19
See, e.g., Summary, Hicks, supra note 10, at 1.
20
See, e.g., id.
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Paragraph 3(a): Enemy Combatant Based on Nexus
with Prohibited Organization

a.

Definition of Prohibited Organizations

1217

The data reveal that the government divided a detainee’s enemycombatant status into six distinct categories that describe the terrorist
21
organization with which the detainee was affiliated. A breakdown of
the data based on the representation of each group is as follows:
 al Qaeda (32%)
 al Qaeda and Taliban (28%)
 Taliban (22%)
 al Qaeda or Taliban (7%)
 Unidentified Affiliation (10%)
 Other (1%)
The CSRT summary of evidence provides no way to determine
the difference between the “Unidentified Affiliation” and “Other”
categories and no explanation as to why there are separate categories
for “al Qaeda and Taliban” and “al Qaeda or Taliban.” If, after four
years of detention, the government was unable to determine whether
a detainee was affiliated with either al Qaeda or the Taliban, then it is
reasonable to conclude that the government did not have evidence of
the detainee’s affiliation. Under this assumption, the data reveal that
40% of the detainees were not affiliated with al Qaeda and 18% of
the detainees were not affiliated with either al Qaeda or the Taliban.
b.

Nexus with the Identified Organization

The data explain that the government generally ascribed to a detainee one of three degrees of connection between the detainee and
the organization with which he was allegedly affiliated. The government classified detainees as either “fighters for,” “members of,” or
“associated with” a particular terrorist organization. The data illustrate that, regardless of the group to which they were connected, by
far the greatest number of prisoners were identified only as being “associated with” one group or another. The government identified a
21
See e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Detainee Ruhani, Gholam to Pers. Representative at 1,
Ruhani v. Bush, No. 05-2367 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf (Taliban); Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary
of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Wasiq, Abdul Haq to Pers. Representative at 1, Wasiq v. Bish, No. 05-2386 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2006), available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf (al Qaeda and Taliban).
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much smaller percentage—30%—as “members of.” Only 8% were
classified as “fighters for.”
The definition of “fighters for” seems to be obvious, while definitions of “members of” and “associated with” are less clear and could
justify a very broad level of attenuation. According to Evan Kohlman,
the government’s expert on al Qaeda membership, simply being told
that one had been selected as a member would qualify one as a
member:
[A]l-Qaeda leaders could dispatch one of their own—someone
who is not top tier . . . to recruit someone and to tell them [sic], I
have been given a mandate to do this on behalf of senior al-Qaeda
leaders . . . even though perhaps this individual has never sworn
an official oath and this person has never been to an al-Qaeda
training camp, nor have they [sic] actually met, say, Osama bin
Ladin.22

This expansive definition of membership in al Qaeda could thus be
applied to anyone who the government believes has ever spoken to
an al Qaeda member. Even under this broad framework, the government concluded that a full 60% of the detainees did not have this
minimal level of contact with an al Qaeda member.
Membership in the Taliban is different and not clearly defined.
According to the government, one could be a conscripted—and
therefore possibly unwilling—member of the Taliban and still be an
23
enemy combatant. Comparing the nexus between enemy combatants with al Qaeda and the Taliban yields a different result. The “al
Qaeda only” category shows that a large percentage of detainees were
“associated with” (57%) or “members of” (34%), while only 9% were
“fighters for.” In contrast to the “al Qaeda only” category, the “Taliban only” category showed that the government designated a significantly higher percentage of the prisoners as “members of” (48%) and
“fighters for,” (16%) with fewer labeled “associated with” (36%).
Moreover, 78% of the prisoners identified as both “al Qaeda and Taliban” were merely “associated with,” 19% were “members of,” and
3% were “fighters for.” When the government could not specifically
identify a detainee as a member of either al Qaeda or the Taliban,
the degree of connection attributed to such detainees seems tenuous.
22

Transcript of Record at 113, United States v. Paracha, No. 03-cr-01197
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2005).
23
See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 2, Al Murbati v.
Bush, 04-CV-1227 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2004)[hereinafter Summary, Al Murbati], available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_444-565.pdf.
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The government’s summaries of evidence recognize that more
often than not members of the Taliban were not members of al Qaeda. The government categorized more than 54% of the detainees as
exclusively members of al Qaeda or exclusively members of the Taliban, and only 28% of the detainees as members of both. The data
provided no explanation for the explicit distinction between those
persons identified as being connected to “al Qaeda and the Taliban”
as opposed to “al Qaeda or the Taliban.”
2.

Paragraph 3(b): The Government’s Findings on
Detainees’ 3(b) Hostile Acts Against the United States
or Coalition Forces

Although the government’s public position was that these detai24
nees were “the worst of the worst,” the data demonstrate that the
government had already concluded that a majority of those who continued to be detained at Guantánamo had no history of any 3(b) hostile acts against the United States or its allies. According to the government, fewer than half of the detainees engaged in 3(b) hostile
acts against the United States or any members of its coalition. This is
true even though the government’s definition of a 3(b) hostile act
was not demanding. For example, the government determined that
the following evidence was sufficient to constitute a 3(b) hostile act:
The detainee participated in military operations against the United States and its coalition partners.
1. The detainee fled, along with others, when the United States’
forces bombed their camp.
2. The detainee was captured in Pakistan, along with other Uighur fighters.25

Cross-analyzing the paragraph 3(a) and 3(b) data shows that individuals in some groups were less likely to have committed hostile
acts than those in others. In the “al Qaeda or Taliban” group, for example, 71% of the detainees had not been found to have committed
any hostile act. Of the “other” detainees, the 18% whose 3(a) nexus
was either “Unidentified Affiliation,” “al Qaeda or Taliban,” or “Other,” only 24% were determined to have committed a 3(b) hostile act.
It is possible that the less clear the government’s characterization of a detainee’s affiliation with a prohibited group was, the less

24

See Margulies, supra note 3.
Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Abbas, Yusef to Pers. Representative [hereinafter, Abbas,
Summary],
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/
operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000300-000399.pdf.
25
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likely the detainee was to have committed a hostile act. This is particularly notable because the percentage of detainees whom the government could not clearly connect to a prohibited group was so
26
large.
The same pattern holds true when the degree of connection between the detainee and the affiliated group lessens: 32% of the detainees were designated exclusively as “al Qaeda” and 57% of those
detainees were described as “associated with” al Qaeda. Of those
57% who are merely “associated with” al Qaeda, 72% had not committed 3(b) hostile acts. Thus, the data illustrate that not only were
the majority of the al Qaeda detainees merely “associated with” al
Qaeda, but also that the government concluded that a substantial
number of those detainees did not commit 3(b) hostile acts.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT’S EVIDENCE THAT THE DETAINEES WERE ENEMY
COMBATANTS
The data provide at least some answers to two important questions: How was the evidence of the detainees’ enemy-combatant status obtained? And, what evidence did the government have as to the
detainees’ commission of 3(b) violations?
Pakistan was the source of at least 36% of all detainees, and the
Afghanistan Northern Alliance was the source of at least 11%. The
pervasiveness of Pakistani involvement is made clear by the fact that
of the 56% of detainees whose captor was identified, 66% were captured in Pakistan or by Pakistani authorities. Thus, if 66% of the unknown 44% were also captured in Pakistan, the total number of detainees captured in Pakistan or by Pakistani authorities would be
66%.
Since the government presumably knew which detainees were
captured by U.S. forces, it is safe to assume that those whose captors
were not known were captured by some third party. The conclusion
drawn from the government’s evidence is that 93% of the detainees
were not apprehended by U.S. forces. Hopefully, in assessing the
“enemy combatant” status of such detainees, the government appropriately addressed the reliability of information provided by the third
parties who turned over detainees; yet the data provides no assurances that the government employed any proper safeguards against
mistaken identification.

26

The “Others”—accounting for 18% of the total—is comprised of “al Qaeda or
Taliban” (7%), Unidentified Affiliation” (10%), and “Other” (1%).
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The U.S. government promised—and presumably paid—large
sums of money for the capture of persons identified as enemy combatants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. One representative flyer, distributed in Afghanistan, stated:
Get wealth and power beyond your dreams . . . . You can receive
millions of dollars helping the Anti-Taliban Force catch al-Qaeda
and Taliban murderers. This is enough money to take care of
your family, your village, your tribe for the rest of your life—pay
for livestock and doctors and school books and housing for all
27
your people.

Bounty hunters or reward seekers handed people over to American or Northern Alliance soldiers in the field, often disappearing
28
soon after; as a result, there was little opportunity in the field to verify the story of an individual who presented the detainee in order to
receive the bounty award. Where that story constitutes the sole basis
for an individual’s detention at Guantánamo, there would be limited
ability by either the government to corroborate or by a detainee to
successfully refute such an allegation.
One example of the government finding detainees to be enemy
combatants based on information from bounty hunters was the capture of the Uighurs. In the Uighurs’ case, there was little doubt that
the government paid bounties for the capture and detainment of in29
dividuals who were not enemy combatants. At the time when this
30
Report was written, the Uighurs had yet to be released.
The government’s evidence against some of the detainees was
formidable. In those cases, the government’s evidence portrayed the
detainees as powerful, dangerous, and knowledgeable men who enjoyed positions of considerable power within the terrorist organizations. The evidence against them was concrete and plausible. The
evidence provided for most of the detainees, however, was far less
convincing.
The summaries of evidence against this small number of detainees indicated that they played important roles in al Qaeda. This
27

Herbert A. Friedman, Psychological Operations in Afghanistan, AFG. PSYOP
LEAFLET, http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan02.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
28
See, e.g., Jonathan Mahler, The Bush Administration vs. Salim Hamdan, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 44.
29
Josh White & Robin Wright, Detainee Cleared for Release is in Limbo at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2005, at A9.
30
Currently, there are only five remaining Uighurs detained at Guantánamo.
Editorial, Every Zone, WASH. POST, May 24, 2011, at A20 (“[T]he five remaining Chinese Uighurs, have been cleared for release but cannot be returned to their home
country for fear of mistreatment.”).
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evidence, on its face, seems reliable. For instance, the government
found that 11% of the detainees met with Osama bin Laden. Other
examples included:
 a detainee who allegedly drove a rocket launcher to
31
combat against the Northern Alliance;
 a detainee who held a high-ranking position in the Taliban and who tortured, maimed, and murdered Afghan
32
nationals held in Taliban jails;
 a detainee who was present and participated in al Qaeda
meetings discussing the September 11, 2001, attacks be33
fore they occurred;
 a detainee who produced al Qaeda propaganda, includ34
ing the video commemorating the U.S.S. Cole attack;
35
 a detainee who was a senior al Qaeda lieutenant;
 eleven detainees who swore an oath to Osama Bin La36
den.
The examples above are atypical of the CSRT summaries. The
government’s evidence alleged that only a few detainees were ever ac31

See, Memorandum from Recorder on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Sayaf al Habiri to Pers. Representative, Mishal Awad, available
at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000201000299.pdf.
32
See, Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant
Status Review Tribunal—Rahman, Shed Abdur to Pers. Representative (Sept. 4,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000500000599.pdf.
33
See, Memorandum from Recorder on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Al Zahri, Abdul al Rahman to Pers. Representative (Aug. 8,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000400000499.pdf.
34
See, Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant
Status Review Tribunal—Al Mishad, Sharif Fati Ali to Pers. Representative (Dec. 8,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000101000200.pdf.
35
See, Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant
Status Review Tribunal—Husayn, Zayn Al Abidin Muhammad [Abu Zabayadah] to
Pers.
Representative
(Mar.
19,
2007),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000784000819.pdf.
36
See, e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Detainee Al Bahlul, Ali Hamza Ahmed Suleiman to
Pers.
Representative(Sept.
7,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000001000100.pdf.
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tually engaged in activities for al Qaeda or the Taliban. The eleven
detainees who swore an oath to Osama Bin Laden, for example, were
only a fraction of the total number of the detainees at Guantánamo.
The Taliban was a different story. The Taliban was a religious
state that demanded the most extreme compliance of all of its citizens and, as such, controlled all aspects of their lives through perva37
sive governmental and religious operation. Under Mullah Omar,
the leader of the Taliban and Afghanistan’s de facto head of state
from 1996 to 2001, there were eleven governors and various ministers
who dealt with issues such as permitting journalists to travel and overseeing the dealings between the Taliban and non-governmental or38
ganizations in Afghanistan for United Nations aid projects. By 1997,
all international “aid projects had to receive clearance not just from
the relevant ministry, but also from the ministries of Interior, Public
Health, Police, and the Department of the Promotion of Virtue and
39
Prevention of Vice.” There was a Health Minister, Governor of the
State Bank, an Attorney General, an Education Minister, and an Anti40
Drug Control Force. Each city had a mayor, chief of police, and se41
nior administrators. None of these individuals were at Guantánamo
Bay. The Taliban detainees seemed to be people not responsible for
actually running the country. Many of the detainees held at Guantánamo were involved with the Taliban unwillingly as conscripts or otherwise.
General conscription was the rule, not the exception, in Taliban
42
controlled Afghanistan. As explained, “all the warlords had used
boy soldiers, some as young as 12 years old, and many were orphans
with no hope of having a family, or education, or a job, except sol43
diering.”
Just as strong evidence proves much, weak evidence suggests
more. Examples of evidence that the government cited as proof that
the detainees were enemy combatants included:

37

See generally AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM
(2001).
Id. at 99.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 100.
RASHID, supra note 37, at 109.

IN CENTRAL ASIA
38
39
40
41
42
43
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associations with unnamed and unidentified individuals
44
or organizations;
 associations with organizations, the members of which
would be allowed into the United States by the Depart45
ment of Homeland Security;
46
 possession of rifles;
47
 use of a guest house;
48
 possession of Casio watches; and
49
 wearing olive drab clothing.
The following is an example of the entire publically available
record for a detainee who was conscripted into the Taliban:
a. Detainee is associated with the Taliban
1. The detainee indicates that he was conscripted into the Taliban.
b. Detainee engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or its coalition
partners.

44
See, e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Shalehove, Maroof, Saleemovich to Pers. Representative
(Dec.
8,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000201000299.pdf.
45
See, e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Amin, Omar Rajab to Pers. Representative (Sept 22,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000001000100.pdf.
46
See, e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Ami, Shakir Abdurahim Mohamed to Pers. Representative
(Nov.
19,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000201000299.pdf.
47
See, e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Salam, Mohammed Ahmed to Pers. Representative
(Oct.
24,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000500000599.pdf.
48
See, e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Sulayman, Abdul Rahman Abdul Abu Giyth to Pers.
Representative
(Oct.
12,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000201000299.pdf.
49
See, e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Yar, Kushky to Pers. Representative (Nov. 10, 2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000600000699.pdf.
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1. The detainee admits he was a cook’s assistant for Taliban forces
in Narim, Afghanistan under the command of Haji Mullah Baki.
2. Detainee fled from Narim to Kabul during the Northern Al50
liance attack and surrendered to the Northern Alliance.

The government classified other detainees as enemy combatants
because of their association with unnamed individuals. A typical example of such evidence is the following:
1. The detainee is associated with forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States and its coalition partners:
2. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan in November 2001.
3. The detainee traveled and shared hotel rooms with an Afghani.
4. The Afghani that the detainee traveled with is a member of the
Taliban Government.
5. The detainee was captured on December 10, 2001, on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan.51

The government deemed some of these detainees enemy combatants based on their association with identified organizations that
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not prohibit from
entering the United States. In analyzing the charges against the detainees, the Combatant Status Review Board identified seventy-four
organizations that were used to demonstrate links between the detainees and al Qaeda or the Taliban. These seventy-four organizations
were compared to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in the
Terrorist Organization Reference Guide (“Reference Guide”) of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border
52
Protection, and the Office of Border Patrol. The DHS published
the Reference Guide in January 2004, which was the same year in
which the charges were filed against the detainees. According to the
Reference Guide, the purpose of the list is “to provide the Field with
53
a who’s who in terrorism.” Those seventy-four foreign terrorist organizations are classified in two groups: thirty-six “designated foreign

50

Summary, Al Murbati, supra note 23, at 2.
See, e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Al Rushaydan, Abdallah Ibrahim to Pers. Representative
(Oct.
7,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000300000399.pdf.
52
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION
REFERENCE
GUIDE
(2004),
available
at
www.cj.msu.edu/~outreach/wmd/terror_reference.doc.
53
Id.
51
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terrorist organizations,” as designated by the secretary of state, and
54
thirty-eight “other terrorist groups,” compiled from other sources.
Comparing the Combatant Status Review Board’s list of seventyfour organizations that evidenced the detainee’s link to al Qaeda
and/or the Taliban, only 22% of those organizations are included in
the Terrorist Organization Reference Guide. Further, the Reference
Guide describes each organization, quantifies the organization’s
strength, locations or areas of operation, and sources of external aid.
Based on these descriptions of the organizations, only 11% of all organizations listed by the Combatant Status Review Board as proof of
links to al Qaeda or the Taliban are identified as having any links to al
Qaeda or the Taliban in the Terrorist Organization Reference Guide.
Further, only 8% of the organizations identified by the Combatant
Status Review Board even target U.S. interests abroad.
The evidence against 39% of the detainees rested in part upon
the possession of Kalashnikov rifles. Possession of a rifle in Afghanistan does not distinguish a peaceful civilian from any terrorist. The
55
“Kalashnikov culture” permeates both Afghanistan and Pakistan. As
the Pakistani Mission to the United Nations noted:
Our economy has been suffering and continues to suffer because
of the situation in Afghanistan. Rampant terrorism as well as the
culture of drugs and guns—that we call the “Kalashnikov Culture”—tearing apart our social and political fabric—was also a di56
rect legacy of the protracted conflict in Afghanistan.

This was evident not merely to the Pakistani foreign minister, but also
to American college students touring Afghanistan. “There is a big
Kalashnikov-rifle culture in Afghanistan: . . . I was somewhat bemused
when I walked into a restaurant this afternoon to find Kalashnikovs
hanging in the place of coats on the rack near the
57
entrance . . . .”
54

Id.
Afghanistan is also the world’s center for unaccounted weapons; thus, there is
no exact count on the number of weapons in circulation. Arms experts have estimated that “there are at least 10 million small arms within Afghanistan.” WATCHLIST
ON CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT, ISSUE 1: AFGHANISTAN 5 (2001), available at
http://watchlist.org/reports/pdf/afghanistan.report.pdf. The arms flow has included Soviet weapons funneled into the country during the 1979 invasion, arms
from Pakistan supplied to the Taliban, and arms from Tajikistan that equipped the
Northern Alliance. Id.
56
Shamshad Ahmad, Permanent Representative of Pak. to United Nations,
Statement to the United Nations on Afg., Pakistan (Dec. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/spanish/aboutun/organs/ga/56/verbatim/a56pv89e.pdf.
54
Barnaby Hall, Letters from Afghanistan, 89 DUKE MAG. 1 (2002), available at
http://www.dukemagazine.duke.edu/dukemag/issues/111202/afghan1.html.
55
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The government treated one’s presence at a “guest house” as
58
evidence supporting a finding that one was an enemy combatant.
The evidence against 27% of the detainees included their residences
while traveling through Afghanistan and Pakistan. But, stopping at
such facilities is common for all people traveling in the area. In the
region, the term “guest house” refers simply to a form of travel ac59
commodation.
Numerous travel and tourism agencies, such as
Worldview Tours, South Travels, and Adventure Travel include overnight stays at local guest houses and rest houses on their tour package
itineraries and lists of accommodations, which are marketed to west60
ern tourists. Guest houses and rest houses typically offer budget
rates and breakfast. American travel agents advise American tourists
to expect to stay in guest houses in either country.
In one case, the government cited the detainee’s possession of a
Casio watch or the wearing of olive drab clothing as evidence that the
61
detainee was an enemy combatant. No basis was given to explain
why such evidence makes the detainee an enemy combatant.
V. CONTINUED DETENTION OF NON-COMBATANTS
The most well recognized group of individuals who were held to
be enemy combatants and for whom summaries of evidence were

58

See, e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Aleh, Ali Bin Ali to Pers. Representative (Oct. 20,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000500000599.pdf.
59
See Stacy Perman, Aiding Afghanistan with Style, BUS. WK. (June 7, 2005),
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/jun2005/sb2005067_5111_sb013.h
tm (describing an Afghani woman named Mahboba who hopes to open a chain of
women’s guest houses while gaining assistance from participation in a program sponsored by the Business Council for Peace); see also Paul Tough, The Reawakening, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 98 (describing the guest houses in which
the reporter and his girlfriend stayed while he explored the budding tourism industry in Afghanistan).
60
See Adventure Holiday in Pakistan: Budget Hotels and Guesthouses,
http://www.south
SOUTHTRAVELS.COM,
travels.com/asia/pakistan/index.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2011); Introduction,
ADVENTURE TRAVEL, http://www.adventure-touroperator.com/main.html (last visited
Sept. 28, 2011); Services Along the Silk Road: Accommodations, WORLDVIEW TOURS,
http://www.worldviewtours.com/service/accomodation.htm (last visited Sept 28,
2011).
61
See Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 1, Al Edah v. Bush,
No.
05-280
(D.D.C.
July
13,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_191-236.pdf.
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62

available are the Uighurs. These individuals are Chinese Muslims
63
who fled persecution in China to neighboring countries. The detainees then fled to Pakistan when Afghanistan came under attack by
64
the United States after September 11, 2001. The Uighurs were ar65
rested in Pakistan and turned over to the United States. The United
66
States detained at least two dozen Uighurs found in Afghanistan and
Pakistan at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The government originally determined that these men were enemy combatants, just as the government determined for all of the other detainees. The government
subsequently decided and publicly conceded that many of the Uighur
detainees in Guantánamo Bay were wrongly found to be enemy com67
batants and should no longer be detained.
Just how many more of the detainees were wrongly found to be
enemy combatants remains to be seen. The evidence that satisfied
the government that the Uighurs were enemy combatants paralleled
the evidence against the other detainees—but the evidence against
the Uighurs was sometimes even stronger.
The evidence against the Uighurs paralleled the evidence
against the other detainees in that the Uighurs:

62

Uighurs, a Turkic ethnic minority of eight to twelve million people primarily
located in the northwestern region of China and in some parts of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, face political and religious oppression at the hands of the Chinese government. The Congressional Human Rights Caucus of the United States House of
Representatives has received several briefings on these issues, including the information that the People’s Republic of China “continues to brutally suppress any peaceful
political, religious, and cultural activities of Uighurs, and enforce a birth control policy that compels minority Uighur women to undergo forced abortions and sterilizations.” U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, Briefing for Congressional Human
Rights Caucus (Feb. 20, 2006) (on file with author); see Robin Wright, Chinese Detainees Are Men Without a Country, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2005, at A1 (noting that in response to oppression by the Chinese government, many Uighurs fled to surrounding
countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan).
63
World & Nation Update: At Home, NEWSDAY, June 5, 2008, at A33.
64
Id.
65
Uighur Detainee Seeks to Stay in Guantanamo—To Mind Bother, IRISH TIMES, Sept.
29, 2009, at 12.
66
Uighurs
in
Guanatanamo,
UIGHUR
HUM.
RTS.
PROJECT,
http://uhrp.org/categories/Issues/Uyghurs-in-Guantanamo/?Page=9 (last visited
Oct. 5, 2011).
67
Since this Report’s initial publication, the Uighurs’ habeas petitions have been
granted. See William Glaberson, Judge Orders 17 Detainees at Guantánamo Freed, N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
7,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/washington/08detain.html.
Subsequently,
however, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit “unanimously overturned [the]
judge’s order that would have freed” the seventeen detainees. William Glaberson,
Appeals Court Stops Release of 17 Detainees in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at A19.
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68

 were Muslims;
69
 were in Afghanistan;
70
 associated with unidentified individuals or groups;
71
 were trained to use Kalashnikov rifles;
72
 stayed in guest houses;
73
 were captured in Pakistan; and
74
 were captured by bounty hunters.
If such evidence was insufficient to detain these persons as
“enemy combatants,” the data analyzed by this Report suggests that
many other detainees should not have been classified as “enemy
combatants.” The detainees were afforded no meaningful opportunity to test the government’s evidence against them. Some of them
remain incarcerated.

68
See, e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Asam, Zakirjan to Pers. Representative (Dec. 6. 2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000500000599.pdf.
69
Id.
70
See, e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Mamut, Abdul Helil to Pers. Representative (Sept. 16
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000300000399.pdf.
71
See, e.g., Abbas, Summary, supra note 25.
72
See, e.g., Memorandum from OIC, CSRT on Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Abdul Rahman, Abdul Ghappar to Pers. Representative
(Oct.
29
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000300000399.pdf.
73
See, e.g., id.
74
See Louisa Lim, Tiny Island to Take 17 Guantanamo Detainees, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(June 10, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105188932.

